This Is Not About Cows: Historic and Contemporary Challenges to South-Central Madagascar’s Cattle Systems by Myers, Dan
SIT Graduate Institute/SIT Study Abroad
SIT Digital Collections
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection SIT Study Abroad
Fall 2015
This Is Not About Cows: Historic and
Contemporary Challenges to South-Central
Madagascar’s Cattle Systems
Dan Myers
SIT Graduate Institute - Study Abroad
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection
Part of the African Studies Commons, and the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons
This Unpublished Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the SIT Study Abroad at SIT Digital Collections. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection by an authorized administrator of SIT Digital Collections. For more information, please
contact digitalcollections@sit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Myers, Dan, "This Is Not About Cows: Historic and Contemporary Challenges to South-Central Madagascar’s Cattle Systems" (2015).









This Is Not About Cows: Historic and Contemporary Challenges 

















Academic Advisor: Prof. Bernardin Rabarijoana 
Academic Director: Roland Pritchett 







                                                          Abstract 
Madagascar’s most cattle-dependent regions have, in recent years, been surrounded by 
narratives of a sudden and violent decline in both the sheer number of and benefits conferred by 
the nation’s distinctive zebu cattle, narratives which largely attribute this decline to theft and 
insecurity. This paper examines the broader state of cattle-based livelihoods in two such 
regions, Haute Matsiatra and Ihorombe, through evidence garnered from semi-structured 
interviews conducted over three weeks in the major cattle market towns of Ambalavao and 
Ihosy, and in the rural commune of Sakaviro, five kilometers south of Ambalavao. By 
incorporating secondary historical sources and recent work from both Malagasy and Western 
academics, the paper finds that the cattle economy has cyclically experienced high levels of 
related violence, foreign involvement in cattle trafficking, and conflict between and among the 
local and Malagasy state institutions involved in the process. However, the paper also finds that 
this historically cyclical system is under increasing duress from two mutually worsening sets of 
stressors: one constituted by deepening poverty, environmental adversity, and population 
growth, the other a pervasive process of social disintegration within pastoralists communities 
and the institutions that work with them. It concludes with a set of recommendations for relevant 
actors in an attempt to avoid the worst-case scenario- the collapse of cattle-based livelihoods 














For my Grandma, Geraldine “Tedde” Myers, whose certainty that when cows lay down it means 
it’s going rain would have come in handy in a place where nothing is ever less certain than cows 
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Introduction: Narratives, Questions, and Purpose- 
In late September of this year, I found myself sitting at a dinner table in Mahajanga, in 
the northwest of Madagascar, hearing one hell of a story. I’d heard a bit about the rampant 
cattle theft currently afflicting the south of the country, and had asked my host for her views on 
the subject. To my surprise, she calmly replied that what most people did not know was that the 
thieves, known as dahalo, were “made”, not born. Members of the Bara ethnic group living in 
Madagascar’s southern forests, they consisted of a sort of “medicine” of pearls, cattle horns, 
leaves, and red and black fabrics. I choked on my rice in surprise at the time, but I don’t think I 
would do so today. Madagascar is, for better or for worse (usually both), a country often defined 
by its narratives. I suspect that this is partially attributable to the strength of the Malagasy as a 
nation of orators, of Madagascar as the land of kabary. For me, no conversation on the subject 
of the country’s past and present has passed without one or another convincingly grand account 
of the fate of the place being conjured up by one of my hosts. I’ve grown rather familiar with 
each these: the tumble off of the cloud nine that was the heyday of the First Republic, a corrupt 
state slowly breaking the backs of a noble and courageous people, foreign powers meddling to 
hold back the full potential of the Malagasy, and so on. The stories have their respective 
adherents, and more often than not a firm grounding in the truth. There is one portion of the 
Malagasy experience, however, where the stories seem to have taken a bus-too-many out of 
town, to some dark edge of what’s known and expected, where they compete with each other 
for a sheer lack of believability. To my steadily evolving surprise since I arrived here, these 
stories are being told about cattle, and more often than not about their theft. They are told by 
outsiders: There is the story told on the front pages of the Antananarivo-based newspapers 
seemingly every morning, of murderous bands of thieves roaming lawless regions in defiance of 
valiant forces of order. There’s the inevitable accompanying tale of the debasement of a rite of 







chaotic situation on the distant southern plains. One hears, too, the story of state complicity in 
heinous reprisals against pastoralist communities told in recent years by, among others, 
Amnesty International and the French journalist Bilal Tarabey (Tarabey 2014). While these 
stories of dahalo are worth telling, an entirely different pack of stories is being told more often by 
insiders: One is that of the inextricable link between the omby and the Malagasy, for whom the 
cattle serve in a host of indispensable capacities. Another is a darker story being told about the 
precipitous decline of Madagascar’s cattle and the ways of life that depend on them. These are 
but a few of the stories, and a different paper would be well-spent in properly telling them.  This 
paper, however, was not written to relate these stories (which have been buzzing around my 
head since I first heard them): rather, it is an attempt to confront them. In writing about omby, 
one cannot avoid dealing with these narratives, accepting some and rejecting others, in order to 
(I’ve hoped) depict the relevant characters and events as they actually exist. To be fair, my 
research has increasingly led me to the conclusion that my version of events will be just that –a 
different account of the same story. That being said, I strongly believe that the tales told by both 
Westerners and the Malagasy about cattle in Madagascar have fallen several steps short of 
being holistic, to the disadvantage of those who have heard them. This one attempts to bridge 
at least part of the gap by answering some of the more tangible questions which led me to 
undertake this research in the first place: What are the effects of broader social, economic, and 
political processes on cattle-based livelihoods in southern Madagascar? What are these 
livelihoods, precisely, and how do they work? How do local and national institutions interact with 
these livelihoods?  Has there been a decline among pastoralist economies in the areas of 
study? If so, why? How do broader processes like urbanization, climate change, drought, 
political instability, crime, and population growth effect pastoralism here? It is only in providing a 
few tenuous answers to these questions that this paper aims to meet its broader aim: to cut 







provide an explication of the current state of omby systems and the people who depend on 
them. If such an explication can be even plausibly forwarded, my hope is that it will spur further 
research on a topic which has been woefully under-examined by Western academics. Towards 
this end, I should acknowledge the fundamental process that has shaped this research: that of a 
discernible and quickening decline in the number of cattle in Madagascar. The remainder of this 
paper will explore the myriad causes of this decline, and its broader implications for the 
populations most affected by it. Put simply, the Malagasy cattle economy is a bellwether 
system. It is an integral part of rural life, and a vital liaison with the urban world. As a functioning 
element of Malagasy well-being, it is an indicator of many of the broader processes eating away 
at Madagascar’s social fabric. Although the fact is rarely given sufficient attention by outside 
observers or cattle professionals, the cattle economy is by its very nature historically cyclical. I 
contend that this cycle is today, however, beset by two new, very different sets of stressors- an 
increasing strain on daily life made up of deepening poverty, environmental adversity, and 
population growth, and a pervasive process of social disintegration within pastoralist 
communities and the institutions that work with them. Moreover, the effects of changes taking 
place within this system extend far beyond its constituent elements: the holistic role played by 
cattle for those who live in tandem with them means that any decline in the strength of the 
system will have far-reaching effects on nearly every aspect of rural life. These effects can only 
be truly understood in light of the historical, political, and economic backgrounds of both the 
system and the study sites in question, and with an introduction to some of the basics of how 
pastoralist economies function and why it’s important that they continue to do so. Then, drawing 
from both interviews and participant observation, I will outline the broad workings of today’s 
cattle system with a particular focus on the regions of study, and begin to elucidate the causes 
and effects of the cattle decline mentioned above. Almost inevitably, I will devote some space to 







“hardship” stress, and of social and institutional cohesion, in the context of cattle, as conveyed 
to me by my informants. I will also analyze the themes emerging from the conversations of the 
past three weeks in view of both sets of stressors, which I will refer to here as the “hardship 
trinity” and “multilevel anomie”. Finally, I discuss the wide-ranging effects of these findings as a 
whole, provide some recommendations rooted in the views expressed by my informants, and 
pose questions for future study.  
                                                     Methodology- 
This paper is the product of 35 semi-structured interviews1 conducted across three sites along 
southern Madagascar’s “cattle corridor” (Route Nationale 7) from November 8th to November 
23rd, 2015. I spent 6 days in the cattle market town of Ambalavao, at the southern edge of the 
central highlands in Haute Matsiatra region, 5 days in a rural commune, Sakaviro, five 
kilometers to the south, and five days in the cattle market town of Ihosy, the plateaued capital of 
Ihorombe region. The sites were selected for a variety of reasons: the intrinsic importance of 
Ambalavao and Ihosy to the cattle economy, the timely availability of a rural contact in the 
Sakaviro area, and the potential insights inherent in comparing two geographically approximate 
(but ethnically and economically diverse) regions. Both Ambalavao and Ihosy are, in fact, useful 
locations for interviewing informants from rural areas, serving as they do as regional hubs of 
exchange for their respective hinterlands. This was a particularly useful function in light of 
increasing insecurity across wide swathes of rural Haute Matsiatra and Ihorombe, which limited 
my possibilities for study within the rural context. Interviews were conducted with herders, local 
government officials, Ministry of Livestock officials, and market insiders, to name a few of the 
major informant groups. The data from these interviews was supplemented by three days of 
observation in the markets of Ambalavao and Ihosy, and time spent observing the versatile 
                                                          







roles of cattle in the rural setting of Sakaviro. My findings draw on a diverse body of literature 
dealing with the history of the cattle systems and peoples I encountered throughout the study, a 
theoretical background for the various factors surrounding cattle decline, and other insights into 
rural life and pastoralism as it exists here in southern Madagascar. In synthesizing these 
elements, and viewing them as parts of a larger whole, I was able arrive at some of the tentative 
conclusions outlined above.  
Ethical Considerations- 
Cattle are, at the moment, an extremely sensitive topic of conversation in the areas in 
which this research was conducted. Much of this sensitivity can be attributed to entirely 
understandable fears of cattle theft and the violence against people which frequently 
accompanies it. These fears can extend to topics I initially considered innocuous, like the mere 
number of cattle a herder owns. Most offered this freely, but several herders I spoke with were 
palpably suspicious of the idea of providing any details on herd size, and I quickly learned that 
this was a topic better brought up by the participant than of my own initiative. That broader 
principle ended up being my rule of thumb during interviews. If theft was not brought up by 
participants, it was not discussed. The same was true of corruption within the cattle economy, 
the breathtaking extent of which proved to be one of the project’s principal sensitivities. At times 
it seemed as if every actor I spoke with had (convincing) reason to believe that every other actor 
was guilty of malfeasance. Again, I waited to discuss the topic until it was introduced by the 
participant: otherwise it was not discussed. All of this should be more than sufficient to give the 
reader an indication of the working and personal relationships which could be damaged, the 
criminal charges which could be brought, and the bodily harm which could be inflicted if I chose 
to employ the names of my participants in this paper. The fundamental responsibility of the 







said, I do strongly believe (in keeping with conversations I’ve had with my thesis advisor at the 
University of Denver) in the inalienable accountability of institutions, and so will reference them 
as freely as my prerogative to protect the personal identities of my participants permits. It is also 
incumbent upon me as a responsible researcher to present as balanced of an image as 
possible of the parties discussed in this study, something which I will try my utmost to do 
throughout the paper. In terms of the findings themselves, research is justifiable only to the 
extent to which it can act as a net positive in the lives of those who participate in it. The tone 
and content of the conversations I had with people in all three of my sites leads me to believe 
that if nothing else, discussing the subjects we did provided an outlet for frustrations and ideas 
participants might not have otherwise found occasion to express. With this in mind, I have tried 
to accurately report the views and concerns of my participants, in the hopes that future 
research, or well-connected readers, may draw relevant lessons for future involvement with 
rural livelihoods or pastoralism. It is also important to acknowledge the inherent power 
differential in my reporting any of these findings as a white, foreign researcher. I attempted to 
put participants at ease concerning this differential by trying to actively minimize the formality of 
the occasion: greeting and chatting in Malagasy before interviews, in particular, was essential to 
making interviews more conversational than inquisitional. Finally, a major ethical concern (and a 
potential limitation for the validity of any of these findings) is the large preponderance of male 
informants who took part in this study. The Malagasy cattle economy is staffed almost 
exclusively by men, with agriculture in the areas where I studied often being seen as the domain 
of women. While I wrestled with the issue throughout the interview process, I ultimately 
determined that studied attempts to include female perspectives on some of the broader social 
questions I was examining was a potentially useful way to temper some of the one-sidedness of 
my data and welcome in other perspectives from these communities. Still, cultural 







knowledge of a male relative, conveyed to me by a contact from the area of study, led me to 
restrict my interviews with women to government and private sector offices (which, it turns out, 
are also overwhelmingly male). Regardless, I have made every effort to address these ethical 
concerns in both the recording and reporting of the information I was fortunate enough to glean 
from my participants. 
                                                        Limitations- 
Whatever else, dear reader, you learn from this paper, keep in mind that it is predicated upon 
the results of 35 interviews conducted over three weeks by a first-time researcher. The depth 
and quality of my questions and interactions is, quite simply, a serious limitation on the validity 
of the results. While I believe I was able to assemble a body of evidence sufficient to identify 
some of the most immediately relevant factors, I would have liked to have had 6 months to do 
this project, and another 3 to prepare for it. Unfortunately, I had neither, which meant a short 
project with very little preparation, and quite a lot of potential error. For better or worse, you are 
reading the result. The second most immediate limitation was the existence of two distinct 
language barriers in the form French and Malagasy. I was able to conduct a large majority of my 
interviews in French (which I speak adequately enough for the purposes of this project), but that 
fact doubtlessly changed both the content and tone of my conversations by injecting the 
presence of a third (and colonial) language between myself and my participants. With that in 
mind, I did conduct several interviews in Malagasy, which I speak at an elementary, but 
passable, level. These interviews provided me with insights (which I made certain to verify ad 
nauseam during conversations) that I would not have otherwise garnered, particularly in the 
markets, where much less French was spoken than among most of my other groups of 
informants. That being said, I am sure that quite a bit of additional information was lost in 







virtually nobody spoke a foreign language. While I was fortunate enough to receive some rural 
perspectives through my visit to Sakaviro, I was unable, for want of time and concerns over 
security, to pursue a comparable stay in rural Ihorombe, which no doubt would have provided 
me with altogether different answers from a very different social and physical environment. I 
was also constantly confronted with a lack of reliable quantitative information, which left me 
dependent on the responses of my informants and my own powers of observation to 
corroborate some of the most commonly discussed trends. While some quantitative information 
is included below, I was informed by several people ostensibly responsible for gathering such 
information that the Malagasy government, for instance, had no real idea of how many cattle 
were in the country. As concerns state sources as a whole, I am aware that the preponderance 
of civil servants among my informants could well imbue the project with a modernist streak 
implicitly disparaging of informants outside of state institutions (the long history of which is 
discussed below). To balance this, I have made a real effort to engage critically with this 
modernist, state-constructed narrative. Finally, my relatively limited sample size and the 
outsized number of well-educated French speakers within it likely gave me a very different set of 
data than might have been the case had I used a translator for every interview2. With that in 
mind, I have tried to ensure that my findings are as valid as the circumstances have permitted 
them to be. This meant attempting to gather as much high-quality data as I could in the limited 
time available to me, grounding it in relevant secondary sources, and adhering to the ethical 
standards set for the project by both myself and my Local Review Board. 
 
                                                          
2 At the same time, 35 interviews has proven rather more than I can process for a paper being written in less than 
a week, so I will likely be unable to do that much justice to the valuable information my informants were kind 







                                                         Background- 
Study Sites- 
In the southern third of Haute Matsiatra region at the edge of Madagascar’s central highlands, 
Ambalavao sits along Route Nationale (RN) 7. RN 7 runs south from the nation’s capital, 
Antananarivo, through the regional capital and major city of Fianarantsoa, and southwest to the 
coastal city of Toliara.  According to the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative’s 
(OPHI’s) June 2015 Country Briefing on Madagascar, Haute Matsiatra (which contains 5.4% of 
the national population) ranks 11th out of the nation’s 22 regions in its multidimensional poverty 
index (MPI), with an MPI of 0.400, compared with a national score of 0.357, and a national rural 
score of 0.396 (Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (2015), p.5). Statistically 
speaking at least, the region is thus highly typical of the economic conditions found elsewhere 
on the island. It is of further value as a site because of the widespread amalgamation of 
agriculture and livestock raising, both of which have their regional economic centers in 
Ambalavao markets. The aforementioned highway is the main artery for the transport of cattle 
from southern Madagascar to the major consumption markets of Antananarivo (often referred to 
as Tana) and Toamasina. As a direct result of the highway’s construction in the early 20th 
century, Ambalavao’s market was founded in 1916 as a point of departure for cattle being 
purchased by buyers from the northern highlands (usually of the Merina ethnic group from 
around Tana) (B. Rabarijoana, personal communication, 11/23/2015). It functions in much the 
same way today as it did then, relying heavily on the steady flow of cattle on Wednesdays and 
Thursdays around which the rest of the local economy is based. After all, Ambalavao is a town 
of exchange, and not merely within the cattle economy. On Wednesdays, farmers from the 
surrounding countryside come to town to do business, sell produce, and buy essential goods. 







the district government and most of the area’s schools, and as the social gathering place for 
those coming from the outlying rural communes (Anonymous, personal communication, 
11/09/2015). One of said communes is Sakaviro, five kilometers south of town, where I spent a 
portion of my study. Sakaviro is in fact a loose collection of five villages: Malalia (where I was 
based), Ambalatsilalova, Soalatsena, Visambo, and Ampiafana. The commune has a population 
of roughly 1,000. Its inhabitants are farmers and livestock raisers from the Betsileo ethnic group, 
which also purportedly makes up about 85% of the population of Ambalavao. It’s an hour’s walk 
from Malalia to a larger village along the highway called Iaratsena, and two hours back to 
Ambalavao. It is, nevertheless, surprisingly isolated. Health services and education beyond the 
primary level are found only in Iaratsena and Ambalavao. Farmers plant rice, corn, and a bevy 
of other crops, and raise cattle, pigs, and chickens. Agriculture and animal husbandry are the 
only widespread economic activities in any of the five villages, all of which I visited. It is crucial 
to note that for the inhabitants of Sakaviro, identities as farmers and pastoralists aren’t mutually 
exclusive; rather, they’re crucially complementary to the livelihoods of those who lay claim to 
them. The region falls within a tropical highland climate, with more plentiful rain in the north 
gradually lessening as one heads south, and again as one heads from east to west. Both 
Ambalavao and Sakaviro fall within the relatively rainy southeastern portion of the region, which 
seems to have been traditionally conducive to agriculture (Malagasy Ministry of the 
Environment, 2006). Ihosy, meanwhile, lies 2 hours southwest along the RN 7 from Ambalavao, 
where it serves as the capital of Ihorombe region. With only 1.9% of the national population, 
OPHI ranks it as the sixth-poorest of Madagascar’s 22 regions, with an MPI score of 0.448 
(Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (2015), p.6). Within Ihorombe, there are 
three different microclimates: a dryer climate in the west not unlike the area around Morondava, 
a wetter eastern portion similar to the east coast, and an intermediate zone around Ihosy itself. 







plowing, fertilizer, etc. In the west of the region, the soil isn’t of the variety that needs tilling-
people grow corn and manioc, which do well even with less water, as well as rice where 
irrigation is available. There are more head of cattle in the west than in the east of the region 
because of the more favorably flat topography and resulting suitable pasturage (purportedly 
some of the best to be found anywhere in the country) (Anonymous, personal communication, 
11/20/2015). The region is more economically dependent on cattle raising in its own right than is 
the case in Haute Matsiatra, as becomes apparent when one drives through the drier and 
largely farmless west of the region. Ihosy serves in a similar capacity to Ambalavao as a town of 
exchange for the surrounding area, including as a major national cattle market (routinely 
described to me as the third-largest, behind Ambalavao and the western town of 
Tsiroanomandidy, which participants alternately listed as the largest.) However, it has recently 
witnessed something of a population boom as a result of a sapphire rush in nearby Ilakaka 
since the year 2000. When mining doesn’t work out for migrants who arrive in the region to 
search for gems, they often stay in the region and enter small-scale commerce in Ihosy. As a 
result of this heavy migration, less than 10% of the city’s population of roughly 50,000 (there 
hasn’t been a national census in Madagascar since 1993) people are from the Bara ethnic 
group, who constitute a large majority in the cattle-raising hinterland of Ihorombe (Anonymous, 
November 20, 2015).  
Madagascar: Contemporary Political and Economic Situation- 
Shortly after a centralized state headed by monarchs of the highland Merina ethnicity gained 
control over most of the country in the late 19th century, Madagascar fell under French colonial 
rule in 1895. The colonial period was largely characterized by French extraction of natural 
resources and a series of policies aimed at bolstering the role of Merina civil servants in 
positions of power at the expense of most of the country’s other ethnic groups, known 







considerable success, and largely stifled serious Malagasy resistance to colonialism (apart from 
a revolt crushed in 1947) until pressure began to mount internationally and in Madagascar for 
an end to the colonial project. In 1960, Madagascar achieved independence with the 
proclamation of the First Malagasy republic under President Philibert Tsiranana, from 1960 to 
1972. This period was remembered as something of a golden age by many of my informants, as 
the economy has steadily deteriorated since Tsiranana was forced out of power by national 
protests in 1972. There then followed three years of political chaos culminating with the rise to 
power in 1975 of a military commander named Didier Ratsiraka, who proclaimed the Second 
Republic and subsequently introduced socialist-style collectivization reforms during his long and 
undemocratic reign, which culminated in his own ouster in elections spurred by popular protests 
in 1993, inaugurating the Third Republic. He won re-election in 1997, but his rule quickly 
became unpopular again, and in 2002 another political crisis developed between forces loyal to 
President Ratsiraka and the then-Mayor of Antananarivo, Marc Ravalomanana. Ravalomanana 
ultimately won out, and implemented a series of free market reforms during his seven year 
reign. Losing popularity himself by 2009, he left office during yet another political crisis centered 
around the main figure of the opposition, then-Mayor of Antananarivo Andry Rajoelina, who 
subsequently inaugurated today’s Fourth Republic. From 2009-2014 Rajoelina presided over a 
period of “Transition”, which eventually culminated in the election of the current president, Hery 
Rajaonarimampianina. Although the nation has enjoyed some modest periods of economic 
growth between each of the numerous crises, every subsequent transition has halted any 
nascent progress.  National GDP has shrunk considerably since independence, and living 
standards declined by 40% between 1971 and 2004 alone (Kull, 2004, p. 30). While it’s difficult 
to know the exact numbers because of the lack of any recent census, roughly three quarters of 
Madagascar’s population live in rural areas, making agriculture and animal husbandry the 







has been hit hard by the crises, and tourism numbers have not yet recovered. Even natural 
resource extraction has soured in recent years, with mineral busts, for example, putting many of 
Ilakaka’s sapphire miners out of work. Although today’s political situation seems more stable 
than it did a few years ago, insecurity has been bemoaned as particularly severe since 2009, 
and many of my informants traced a majority of their current ills to that inauspicious year 
(Roland Pritchett, personal communication, September 8, 2015). 
Cattle System History- 
Today, there are significant populations of cattle in virtually every part of Madagascar. However, 
certain groups and regions of the country have, historically, had a more intensive relationship 
with herding than others. Campbell (2005, p.29) identifies the Bara, Mahafaly, Antandroy, 
Tsimehety and Sakalava peoples as some of the most notable of these. It is crucial to note that 
each of these groups had some varying primary conception of cattle as bearers of wealth and 
status, rather than as mere conduits for consumption of meat or milk (p.29)3. Crop cultivation 
was an indispensable (largely female) activity, but remained a secondary one when compared 
to the more socially definitive ownership of cattle. Interestingly, in light of contemporary human-
caused brushfires in Malagasy grasslands, while such seasonal fires intended to improve the 
growth of fresh grass were common in the savannas, it was the intensity of burning in the 
highlands that “resulted in such erosion ‘ as to leave many acres totally inaccessible to cattle’” 
(p.29). The Merina king Andraintsimitovy (c. 1650-70) seemed cognizant of the potential scarcity 
of cattle in the highlands, and set a limit of 15 cattle to be butchered in each market in his realm 
(p.29). Nevertheless, there is a long history of cattle being exported from Madagascar for 
foreign consumption. In the early 1800s, 1,350 head were exported to the Mascarenes 
                                                          
3 Several of my informants decried what they perceived to be a novel, harmful over-commercialization of cattle 







(Madagascar’s island neighbors) for around $30 a head (Campbell p.184). The Merina state 
controlled some 30-40% of the market during this period, but there were, even then, signs of 
conflict between the monarchy and herders elsewhere on the island. From 1828-50, the Merina 
crown mandated that all cattle intended for religious ritual use be forfeited to imperial 
slaughterhouses (Campbell p.186). Additionally, the export of cattle within the considerable 
territory of the Merina Empire “was a court monopoly”, and the state made sure to take 
advantage. Setting a local price for purchase from herders at $0.0071 a bullock, the state resold 
the cattle to foreign merchants on the coast for between $11 and $15 a head (these prices fell 
considerably after the French conquest) (Campbell p.184). The scale of cattle export increased 
accordingly: 12,000 head to Reunion between 1821-45, 10-12,000 to the Mascarenes in the 
50s, 15,000 in the 60s, and so on. By the 1870s, the Bara and Sakalava were themselves doing 
a tidy business exporting to South Africa, providing some 80% of Natal Province’s cattle imports 
between 1875 and 1909 (Campbell p.185). Around that time there was an explosion of growth in 
the export of cattle hides, with American and European traders alternately competing with one 
another and colluding together to force down prices, leading to tensions with Merina dealers. By 
the 1890s, as many as 200,000 hides a year were leaving Madagascar (Campbell p.188). 
Throughout this period, aggressive political and military activity provided some semblance of 
order to the often chaotic and dangerous business that was cattle. From the late 18th century, 
the Merina monarchy began an era of rapid and determined expansion, which largely 
succeeded in spite of the intensity of resistance by the peoples it subjugated. The Merina 
conquest of Betsileo in 1814, and seemingly incessant Merina raids on southern cattle herds 
(usually undertaken with an eye towards future export) provided the growing state with new 
sources of revenue to provide for its rapidly mounting expenses (Campbell p.67). Conversely, 
particularly during the Franco-Merina War of 1883-85, Sakalava and Bara pastoralists furiously 







heartland (Campbell p.336). Despite its foundations as a fundamentally agricultural state, the 
Merina state became heavily invested in cattle raising, as is made clear by its insistent control of 
exports outlined above. Merina kings and queens became major cattle patrons in their own 
right4, embracing the relatively novel form of wealth brought to their attention by territorial 
expansion into cattle-dependent regions. Accordingly, the monarchy began implementing harsh 
penalties against cattle thieves, including the potential reduction of the offender to slave status, 
a year in prison for every head of cattle stolen, and capital punishment, according to the 
situation’s demands. (Rakoto 2011). However, an increase in military conflict in the 1880s, 
particularly with the French, began to erode the state’s capacity to enforce these penalties, in 
part because of its inability to adequately fill its rural military garrisons. As a result, cattle theft 
sky rocketed in the 1880s, particularly in the West and in the central Highlands. Indeed, state 
functionaries were routinely complicit in this theft. A letter from the London Missionary Society to 
the Malagasy Prime Minister chastises these officials, claiming that ” ‘servants of senior officials 
responsible in principle for keeping their herds , are transforming themselves into veritable 
robbers , plundering and enraging entire regions…’” (Rakoto 2011). Rakoto identifies this period 
of military turmoil and state as a cause of the proliferation of dina law, a sort of informal 
communal pact in rural Madagascar, in this case outlining how to arbitrate and settle cases of 
cattle theft. He contrasts the rise of this legal tradition with the implementation of formalist 
French colonial law after 1895. France seems to have played something of a dualistic role in the 
cattle economy during the colonial era. Kaufmann (2008) examines the well-intentioned mess 
created by overconfident French administrators in attempting to eradicate cactus in the 
country’s southwest in hopes of improving the health and number of cattle in the region. The 
case marks an example of an overconfidently “modernist” state convinced of the merit of its own 
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technical solutions heavy-handedly disrupting a more or less balanced system governed by 
local knowledge5. The French involved themselves on a limited scale in the cattle economy 
through the establishment of massive colonial ranches, although the majority of these were 
broken up after Independence (Kull, 2004, p.29). While an ad-hoc French legal system was 
initially ineffective in combatting cattle theft, a delegation of power to mostly-Malagasy staffed 
tribunals tasked with ruling on what the French considered petty crime in 1946 was, to Rakoto, 
behind a sharp decline in the rate of cattle theft in the 1950s. It must be noted, however, that the 
dina system continued to function normally alongside the formal French system. In the years 
after independence, new and localized dina conventions were promulgated in so-called boky 
mavo (yellow books) in the face of various states of independence. An informant in Ihosy 
connected to the dina process explained to me that dina has traditionally worked in coordination 
with local representatives of state institutions, namely authorities within the rural commune and 
fokontany (Anonymous, November 23, 2015).   
Figure 1: Historical Cycle of Cattle System Volatility 
 
                                                          
5 This bears an eerie resemblance to the deleterious anti-fire policies propagated by the Malagasy state in Kull’s 
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History of Bara and Betsileo Areas- 
As early as the 1640s, the French traveler Etienne de Flacourt tells of a king of Ibara, 
Andriamanely, who began to build “a cattle empire” in the savannas of the south (Kent 1970, 
p.139-40). Well before that, though, there were political entities in southern Madagascar rising 
and falling on their respective prowess in the raiding and trading of cattle, often intended for 
foreign export and consumption. Extended family-based political units known as raza were 
founded upon the possession of “a great deal of cattle…This is a kind of belief in predestination 
that compels one to be successful on Earth…in its own way it acts as a powerful economic 
incentive” (Kent 1962, p.30-31). While Bara political units often had short life spans, major clans 
served as reserves of identity and social organization. Similarly, Bara kings, while often limited 
in the temporal extent of their power, played important roles as regulators of cattle looting and 
internecine crime. Kent (1962) speculates that there may have been a centralized Bara political 
unit at one point, but this was certainly not the case by the mid-19th century. In fact, the 
dependence of Bara clan-kingdoms upon revenue from both war and cattle taken as fines for 
breaking the law caused volatile expansion and consolidation among Bara royal families 
struggling to maintain their status on the basis of a uniquely mobile form of wealth- cattle. The 
continual fragmentation of political units made it difficult for interested members of these units to 
obtain community approval for foreign wars, therefore further exacerbating the depth of the 
need for more cattle (Kent 1970 p.148). Despite these internal divisions, outsiders had 
considerable trouble exerting control over Ibara. Refugees fleeing Merina expansion elsewhere 
augmented the numbers of Bara clans and warriors, leading to reprisals against the very areas 
they had fled (Kent 1970 p.124). The Merina managed to maintain a fragile garrison at Ihosy, 
but the Briton James Richardson found 96% of its soldiers missing in 1877, being supposedly 
“elsewhere on trading ventures” (Campbell p.165).  The French struggled for years to gain 







with outsiders were economic in nature as well as conflictual, however. In Bara country, 
between 1607 and 1614, “ ‘there started the trade for rifles, imported by the English, 14 to 16 
head going for one of them’ ” (Kent 1970). For their part, the Betsileo are described by Campbell 
as having been relative latecomers to intensive cattle raising, with the practice having taken root 
by 1810, much later than was the case in Ibara (p.29). Kent (1962) implies that the Betsileo 
were the most pliant and successful subjects of the rising Merina state, quoting a British 
observer as describing their conquest by the Merina as “[having been] one of vast improvement 
for the Betsileo. They now have peace and security, which they never had under their former 
government.” (p.29). This does not seem to be in keeping with the events of 1811, when the 
Merina King Radama I took the Betsileo town of Ambalavao, whose population chose to commit 
collective suicide rather than submit to his rule (B. Rabarijoana, personal communication, 
November 23, 2015)6. While it is also worth noting the reputation of the Betsileo as stalwart 
farmers (B. Rabarijoana, personal communication, November 23, 2015, Kent, 1962, p.29), it is 
crucial to underline the fact that this has not precluded the development of cattle rearing as an 
integral aspect of their broader agricultural processes, in addition to the other roles of cattle 
which I have already outlined (at least in southern Betsileo, where Sakaviro and Ambalavao are 
located).  
Theoretical Background-The Economics of Pastoralism- 
Hatfield and Davies (2006) define pastoralism as “any predominantly livestock-based production 
system that is mainly extensive in nature and uses some form of mobility of 
livestock…regardless of the extent to which it contributes to the household 
economy…Pastoralism is an adaptation to marginal environments, characterized by climatic 
                                                          








uncertainty and low-grade resources. It has considerable economic value and latent potential in 
the drylands, and is central to the livelihoods and wellbeing of millions of the worlds poor.” 
(Hatfield and Davies (2006) p.1, 6). While Haute Matsiatra and Ihorombe do indeed depend 
upon agriculture to varying degrees, the interviews I conducted (particularly in the rural context 
of Sakaviro) left me convinced that my informants were themselves classifiable as pastoralists. 
While agriculture, as was stated above, has long functioned in Madagascar’s cattle belt largely 
as a subsistence-level activity, cattle raising fulfills a number of crucial social and economic 
roles in the areas under study. Both within and beyond the Malagasy context, it may be helpful 
to examine four aspects of the pastoralist experience which became particularly salient over the 
course of this project: 
1. The Intuitive System: Although pastoralism is often seen by outsiders, particularly 
national governments, as an irrational and marginal economic activity, Hatfield and 
Davies argue that it is often in the fact the only rational economic activity in many of the 
more arid parts of the world, both in terms of production and of environmental 
management (Hatfield and Davies, 2006, p.1). The intuitiveness of cattle raising in 
marginal environments is becoming apparent in the increasingly dry regions of Haute 
Matsiatra and Ihorombe where this project took place. 
2. Mobile Banking- Livestock function as reserves of wealth in areas where sufficient 
agricultural surpluses are scarce, and where the workings of industrialized and urban 
economies can seem alien. In a cash economy like Madagascar’s, livestock products 
have value for those outside of pastoralist economies, and thus can be used by herders 
to make enough money to buy other goods- food, private schooling, medicine, etc. 
However, for those who depend upon livestock to function in this capacity, their utility is 







discussions with market informants knowledgeable of the workings of the national cattle 
supply chain: 
In pastoral areas, asset wealth is often high, if volatile, but markets do not enable pastoralists to convert 
that wealth at times of stress. Food entitlement failure in this case can also be considered market failure: 
high transaction costs, poor information flow to producers, lack of competition in supply of goods and 
services and inability to choose the time of sale, because of an absence of alternatives for investment of 
the wealth generated. Selling livestock during favourable periods can often generate significant revenue, 
but this can be of limited value when few goods or services are provided that could make relevant and 
safe investments. Instead, the safest place to store wealth is on the hoof, where the returns to investment 
are substantial during good times, but with the inevitable downfall that its value is eroded at exactly the 
time when it is most useful. (Hatfield and Davies, 2006, p.4) 
 
3. (Unequally) Linked- Despite the tendency of many outside observers to treat pastoralism 
as an isolated system, livestock raising is usually integrally linked to national and global 
economies. That being said, these links are often skewed in favor of outside buyers, 
rather than the pastoralists themselves (this is very much the case in Madagascar, as 
both prices and profits steadily rise for the host of middlemen operating between the 
herder and the eventual consumption market): “ Many pastoralists face constraints in 
realising the economic potential of their system owing to high transaction costs, such as 
long distances to processing plants, absence of formal markets, poor access to 
information and fair contracts, lack of financial services such as credit facilities, and 
excessive government bureaucracy and fees.” (Hatfield and Davies 2006). Pastoralist’s 
own primary production systems have become maddeningly difficult for them to access: 
“Kenya provides one such example, where it is estimated that pastoralists should be 
obtaining up to 70% of terminal livestock prices but in reality they are only averaging 
40% (Kibue, 2005). Ethiopia presents a similar picture, where the proportion of 
transaction costs and service fees at the municipal market in Addis Ababa including 
broker fees is equivalent to an astounding 17% of the purchase price of a steer, 29% of 







alternative markets or that smuggling of live animals, hides and skins from Ethiopia into 
neighbouring countries is costing the treasury an estimated US$100 million each year 
(BBC, 2001). Illegal trade reflects the cost of going the legal route.” (Hatfield and Davies 
2006). Indeed, this lack of proper access to the selfsame systems that depend upon the 
production of pastoralists is largely to blame for the tendency of producers to seek out 
illicit systems in hopes of benefitting more from their own production. 
4. States Just Don’t Understand-  
Much of the exodus of livestock producers from the formal sector can be chalked up to 
senseless overregulation of markets characterized by thin profit margins to begin with: 
“Instead of facilitating this trade to stimulate local economies, and investing in those 
economies, governments tend to impose tariffs and restrictions that ensure the trade 
remains in the informal, or black market, sector, relying on bribes at border posts where 
necessary.” (Hatfield and Davies, 2006, p.13). This acknowledgment of the often corrupt 
and counterproductive role of government in pastoralist supply chains will prove 
prescient, as we shall see. Frequently though, government’s unintentional and 
intentional marginalization of pastoralist economies goes well beyond simple market 
failures: “The perception that pastoralism does not produce significant economic gain 
means that many governments fail to make the necessary public investments in market 
infrastructure, roads, security, education and human and institutional capacity building” 
(Hatfield and Davies, 2006, p.16). More often in southern Madagascar, this lack of 
investment can take on an ethnic overtone, particularly for those from the Bara ethnic 
group, as is detailed below.  








                                              Findings: The Malagasy Cattle Economy 
Over the course of my research, I was given a mountain of information about the structural 
workings of the Malagasy cattle economy, information which varied widely depending on the 
region and institutional affiliation of the speaker. This variation makes it difficult to provide a 
representative summary of the system and how it works, but this is what I have come up with. 
Cattle raising is particularly important in southern, middle-western, and northern Madagascar, 
namely in the Sava, Sofia, Menabe, Bongolava, Antsimo Andrefana, Antandroy, Anosy, Haute 
Matsiatra, and Ihorombe regions, although arguments could be made for the inclusion of others. 
In the formal sector, the cattle are mainly transported by truck from the major cattle markets to 
slaughterhouses in major cities with high beef consumption, like Tana or Tamatave. In the west, 
four or five smaller market towns in the hinterland converge on Tsiroanomandidy, the 
Ambalavao equivalent for western herders, after which they’re sent directly on their way to 
Tana. Many cattle are also driven on foot to Mahitsy, just west of Tana, where butchers and 
slaughterhouse operators from the capital come to make their selections. For cattle coming from 
the north, the Ambalavao equivalent is Mampikony, but this sees the smallest volume of the 
major markets. In the experience of a former buyer, the slaughterhouse buyers from Tana 
worked the dry season from April to September in the Ambalavao markets, and the rainy 
season from October to March out west. During my time in the south, this seasonal divide was 
palpable in the markets both at Ambalavao and Ihosy, where November volume is considered 
particularly low this year (Anonymous, November 3, 2015). Indeed, beyond mere seasonal 
fluctuations in volume, the market is often dependent upon drought conditions in the far south 
(Antandroy, Anosy, Atsimo Andrefana), which, when severe enough, lead to a rush on the 
market by southerners desperate for cash to supplement their failing food crops. An official in 
the Ambalavao market showed me a graph of market activity appearing to confirm the existence 







(Anonymous, November 12, 2015). As droughts have become more and more common, there 
have been fairly regular gluts of the market in September and October as desperate 
southerners sell their bulls. Buyers know this, and take the opportunity to profit from the 
desperation of the vendors, as prices tumble because of the high supply. A former buyer from 
Tana outlined the major links in the cattle economy like this: zebu are typically driven on foot out 
of the deep south (Antandroy, Anosy, and Atsimo Andrefana) to the towns of Betroka, for the 
center-south and Sakaraha for the south-west. From there, the two chains merge on the 
national highway at Ihosy, and are driven by truck to Ambalavao, Madagascar’s largest cattle 
market and where most major buyers come to buy southern cattle on Wednesday and 
Thursdays. That being said, the traditional primacy of the Ambalavao market has been steadily 
eroded since improvements to the road from Ambalavao to Ihosy were made in 1989 
(Anonymous, November 21, 2015). One Ambalavao informant expressed his fear that if the 
municipal government continues to “badly manage”7 the market, Ihosy will supersede 
Ambalavao as the southern cattle marker of choice. At one point, tensions over the shifting roles 
of the two towns led to a summit between the mayors of Ambalavao and Ihosy in an attempt to 
find some sort of equilibrium between the markets through a delineation of “rights of place” 
(Anonymous, November 12, 2015). As it stands, though, there are many dahalo between Ihosy 
and Ambalavao, and transporting cattle by truck between the two gives the patrons (a word that 
arises everywhere, signifying the southern men who own large herds of most of the cattle that 
are sold here) growing reason to worry. The patrons would prefer to stay in Ihosy because 
they’re afraid to make the journey, whether for fear of their own safety or that of their cattle 
(Anonymous, November 9, 2015). Conversely, buyers from the north are reluctant to journey 
directly to Ihosy, even though prices there are considerably lower there (and even lower at 
                                                          







Sakaraha, which is where one of my informants from Ambalavao journeys each Friday to make 
his purchases for re-sale to northern buyers.) As a result of this reluctance on the part of cattle 
merchants to change their buying and selling habits, Ambalavao limps on despite a sizable drop 
in its volume: on a typical market week today, each market might process somewhere between 
6 and 700 head a piece, about half of Ambalavao’s prior traffic, although this fluctuates 
according to seasonal and drought conditions (Anonymous, November 12, 2015). There are a 
few major types of players at work at any given time in market dealings in either Ambalavao or 
Ihosy. The chain was (hypothetically) outlined to me in this way by an informant in Ambalavao: 
Player 1 lives in Sakaraha, and has 500 head of cattle. He gives Player 2 100 head at a given 
price, say 100 ariary (again hypothetical). There’s a deadline on this beneficence: Player 2 has 
to repay Player 1 with a fixed sum on a fixed day, say a week from when he receives them. He 
cannot avoid this, even if he takes a huge hit at the market and makes less than Player 1, 
whose profit is guaranteed. Player 2 is based in Ihosy, maybe. He finds Player 3 in Ambalavao. 
He steeply raises the price per head compared to what he is paying Player 1. Why is all of this 
necessary? Because Patron 1 has no desire to work without an intermediary. Anyways, Player 3 
ups the price again and heads to the Ambalavao market with this stock. The majority of the men 
working in the market are known as panera, or démarcheurs in French. It is they who approach 
the sellers coming from the south on behalf of the buyers coming from the north.  At the market, 
panera approach Player 3 and haggle over the price, which, mind you, has risen considerably 
by this point. The panera make very, very little off of the transaction. Rather the profits flow back 
proportionally back up the chain: Player 1 makes more than Player 2, and so on. In this case, 
Player 2 and 3 are what I heard referred to as panao hira kely, the guys who are buying low in 
southern markets and Ihosy and selling high to buyers in Ambalavao. Of course, Patron 1 is a 
patron, a wealthy cattle owner (usually with hundreds or even thousands of head of cattle) from 







himself a fixed profit, as outlined above. (Anonymous, November 12, 2015). With the cattle 
decline, however, there are fewer and fewer true patrons, and an increasing concentration of 
cattle among those who have managed to protect their herd sizes. However, while these actors 
(and outside ones discussed in greater detail below) are integral parts of the system in which 
they operate, it is also important to recognize the positive spillover effects of the existence of 
cattle markets on the communities which host them. I was told repeatedly in both Ambalavao 
and Ihosy that the strength of the entire local economy was integrally tied to that of the cattle 
markets. If volume is down and fewer people come to town to participate in the market, fewer 
people will buy and sell other things in the general market elsewhere in the town. In places 
without much secondary industry, the presence of a consistent excuse to exchange things is of 
vital importance. While it is, therefore, worth mentioning the role the markets play in towns 
themselves, it is the small-scale herders outside of the markets who make the economy 
function, and as such merit some discussion. 
The Role of Cattle in the Rural Context 
In every village, town, and city in Madagascar, there is a localized and wholly unique role to be 
played by cattle. That reality was impressed upon me by the variety and nuance in the ways that 
omby were used even among Sakaviro’s five villages, let alone large and diverse regions like 
Haute Matsiatra and Ihorombe. It is more than likely that conducting this project with the same 
sets of questions in a different region of Madagascar would have yielded different answers. 
However, while it is important to note this fundamental locality of cattle, there do seem to be a 
few constants. In understanding just how crucial livestock are to Malagasy families in rural 
areas, my opportunity to study in Haute Matsiatra’s Sakaviro commune was invaluable. There, I 
was given the same list of importances of omby in daily life with such regularity that my 







interviews: the zebu is used to work the land for crops, to fertilize the fields, and to pull carts. 
When someone dies, you kill a zebu for people to eat at their funeral, and sell another to pay for 
the funeral itself- the same goes for holidays like famadihana. The zebu serves as a kind of 
bank- if you have zebu and you need money for medicine or school fees, for instance, you sell 
one (Anonymous, November 16, 2015). Beyond these immediately utilitarian uses, however, 
cattle play more subtle but equally vital roles. These were often most apparent in speaking with 
farmers who had none. In the village of Soalatsena, I met two such men. The first was in his 
50s, and had had his family’s herd of 70 head of cattle stolen by “adversaries” when he was a 
boy (the resulting tribunal case was marred by the excesses of some corrupt magistrates). 
Without zebu of his own to plow the fields, he relies on borrowing cattle from other members of 
his community. The number of cattle in the village as a whole has steeply decline in recent 
years, with such intensity that few villagers are active in Ambalavao’s market anymore-they 
need the cattle they have left to work the land, nothing more (Anonymous, November 16, 2015). 
Another man I spoke with was in his late 70s, and had once had as many as 30 head of zebu. 
Poverty forced him to sell those 10 years ago, and now he must rely on loans to pay for things 
like medical costs. He says that zebu are about status: if one has many, one is a respected 
man; without them, he is beneath the man who has more. Without zebu reserves, he can only 
make money by selling his crops (Anonymous, November 16,, 2015). It is in contingency-type 
situations like this that one begins to realize the true extent of the social reliance upon cattle in 
this part of the country. In case of a bad harvest, agropastoralists here can sell their zebu (as 
was discussed in the case of the far south) to buy enough food to make up for the harvest. To 
be sure, there are surplus harvests in certain years. Without cattle to invest in, however, one is 
forced to keep a reserve of cash in the house (which may not last in a run of bad harvests), 
losing the ability to grow the money and improve one’s circumstances. I spoke with a 







clients came from town or the immediate area-most farmers and livestock raisers farmer afield 
did not meet qualifications for participation in their programs because they weren’t producing 
enough to be counted as a “personal economic activity.” In other words, the agency did not 
make loans to subsistence farmers of herders. He also informed me that the three banks 
located in town were used almost exclusively by patrons processing payments from the cattle 
market and state functionaries working in town (Anonymous, November 12, 2015). With formal 
sector banking options unavailable to the population, farmers’ best investment option is 
something always in demand, which can be relatively quickly replenished: cattle. It is useful 
here to speak in terms of the existence of a “poverty trap”, or a progressively worsening set of 
circumstances preventing the poor from escaping poverty (indeed, worsening its existing 
effects). The findings of Thomas and Gaspart (2014) speak to the existence of this phenomenon 
in rural Madagascar. One can observe the existence of the trap in the examples of farmers who 
have managed to prosper because of their zebu. In the village of Visambo, I met a farmer who 
currently owns 14 omby. He once had 30, but he sold most of them to pay for life’s needs- to 
build his house, for instance. He goes to the cattle market every week, where he engages in a 
practice common among many of the small-herders I met: he buys some of the smallest 
available zebu, raises them to a larger size for 4 or 5 years, and sells them back at a profit. In 
this way, he’s constantly growing his herd, and by extension his financial reserves. Note that 
although his herd is smaller than before, he’s converted some of that wealth into more-difficult-
to-acquire sorts of investments; a house, for instance. Another man had a similar story, but had 
sold most of his 20 head to pay for private schooling in Ambalavao for his children. It becomes 
increasingly apparent just how indispensable zebu are in places like Sakaviro: for people who 
routinely told me that the national government had virtually no presence in their area and that 
they had no access to formal sector financial services, the most effective safety net against 







people concerning their access to quality health and education services. While there is a public 
primary school in Sakaviro, participants routinely expressed their belief that state schools were 
of an inferior quality, and those with the means to do so sent their children to private schools in 
Ambalavao. Because of the distance, this also usually meant renting a room for the kids to stay 
in during the week, rather than walking four hours round-trip each day (Anonymous, November 
14, 2015). Similarly, a hospital stay or a much-needed medicine was likely to be well out of the 
quotidian price range of rural inhabitants, so access to these services usually demands that a 
bull be sold, repeatedly in the case of school fees. For the wealthier inhabitants of Sakaviro, the 
ability to afford health and education services (largely provided by profits from selling cattle) 
makes the difference in avoiding the poverty trap that some of my other informants found 
themselves in. Finally, the consequences of not having zebu could be most dire in the lack of an 
ability to invest in the agricultural inputs upon which people there depend for daily life. Without 
the use of manure for fertilizer, for instance, farmers face the difficult choice of spending scarce 
funds on synthetic fertilizer or watching yields decline in land that seems to be getting drier by 
the year. (Anonymous, November 10, 2015) 
Decline: Causes, Effects, and Manifestations- 
As I mentioned towards the beginning of this paper, I was given serious reason to doubt the 
validity of statistical estimates on the number of cattle anywhere in Madagascar. This makes it 
difficult to know the exact scale of what I was repeatedly told is unfolding today: a sharp decline 
in the number of cattle nationwide. That being said, I heard various numbers from my informants 
which seemed to be sufficient cause for alarm: Officials at the Ambalavao market told me that 
the number of head in a typical Wednesday-Thursday market has changed dramatically since 
2000, when Ambalavao consistently sold 1,400 head a week. Now, it’s closer to 6-700 







in the 1980s there were around five cattle for every inhabitant, the number today hovers around 
0.25 (Anonymous, November 23, 2015). The existence of a decline was confirmed by nearly all 
of my informants, in Sakaviro as well as in the towns. It’s manifesting itself in a variety of ways. 
One is smaller herd sizes, both nationally and regionally. While I routinely heard of farmers who 
once had 50-70 head of cattle and Sakaviro, I met none who had more than 15 today 
(Anonymous, November 14, 15, 16, 2015). A prominent panao hira kely at the Ihosy market told 
me that whereas he once routinely took 200 head of cattle to Ambalavao each week, today he 
rarely reached 180 because of the sheer scarcity (Anonymous, November 19, 2015). Even the 
once-mythic herds of the grands patrons of the Grand Sud are rumored to be smaller than 
before: the former buyer from Tana told me that the bovine population of Betroka was 60,000 
when he was a kid, but this has fallen to 35,000 today. The lack of formal statistical evidence 
seems to be more than offset by the burden of evidence provided by the consistency of 
participants’ confirmation that the decline exists. The following sections will unpack the causes 
and effects of this precipitous decline as it concerns the lives of those who depend most on 
cattle. 
The D-Word: Thieves & Omby-  
This paper is, quite consciously, not about the dahalo phenomenon.8 That being said, any 
discussion of cattle today, especially as concerns the decline, would be woefully incomplete 
without some sort of treatment of the issue. In doing so, I’ll largely rely on the accounts provided 
by people I spoke with at all three of my sites. While cattle theft is by no means a recent 
development in Madagascar (see historical discussion above), participants usually felt that the 
situation had become exacerbated sometime in the recent past. Often, this exacerbation was 
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associated with a particular political event: the 2009 crisis, the 2002 crisis, the rise of President 
Ratsiraka, the fall of President Ratsiraka, the fall of President Zafy Albert, etc. Regardless, the 
result of these crises has been increasing lawlessness in rural areas throughout the country, 
particularly in the south. The ways in which this lawlessness was explained tended to take on a 
few specific forms. First and foremost among these was the perceived deepening of intense 
poverty in rural areas, often manifesting itself in astronomical unemployment rates for young 
men (Anonymous, November 9, 11, 2015). The accompanying deterioration of living standards 
will be further discussed below. Second was a conflation of dahalo activity with the Bara 
ethnicity. Traditionally, Bara men have had a custom of stealing a bull or two from a prospective 
bride’s family to prove themselves as men. This practice was often referred to as a “game” or a 
“sport”. (Anonymous, November 9, 2015). However, the custom is increasingly seen (invariably 
by non-Bara informants) as having “degraded” into theft, with rising rates of violence against 
cattle owners and their property. While many participants ascribed this degradation to 
Madagascar’s deepening poverty, a large portion attributed it directly to Bara culture, particularly 
when I spoke to people in Ambalavao. To them, the Bara stole for custom or for “pleasure”. The 
Betsileo, by contrast, had no choice but to steal, often to pay for school fees for themselves and 
their children (Anonymous, November 11, 2015). This division between studious Betsileo and 
hedonistic Bara was equally present in the minds of officials coming from other parts of the 
country (Anonymous, November 11, 2015). Even as thieves, the Betsileo people I spoke to 
differentiated strongly between themselves and their Bara counterparts: “Guys here are small, 
but strong. For the Betsileo, if you have to work you have to work. If you have to fight you have 
to fight. In the south the guys are big, but afraid to die. Betsileo aren’t!” (Anonymous, November 
13, 2015). Interestingly, I heard several young people describe the indispensable working 
relationships between Bara and Betsileo dahalo. Dahalo rarely come from the immediate areas 







away, and act as a sort of guide for the assault, providing information on the best directions to 
approach from, members of the community with guns, etc. The motivation for this betrayal of 
one’s own community (frequently, even of one’s own family) was attributed not to the portion of 
the profits given to the informant, but to rampant jealousy of either wealth or romantic partners 
within rural villages (Anonymous, November 19, 2015). This jealousy will be examined in 
greater details, but for now suffice to say that dahalo operate over long distances, almost 
invariably with a local partner. Crucially, my participants repeatedly underlined the existence of 
dahalo activity as contingent on high demand for stolen cattle. There are different illegal 
networks crisscrossing the country, each known to some, but not all, of the informants in a 
particular market. There are two major endgames for these networks: the reselling of stolen 
cattle back into legitimate markets with false papers, and the direct clandestine export of these 
cattle on the coasts. Insiders in both Ambalavao and Ihosy confirmed the presence of large 
numbers of stolen cattle in the markets they worked in. (Anonymous, November 12, 19, 2015). 
For the grands patrons largely responsible for buying stolen cattle, (at much reduced prices: 
thieves have little desire to hold on to their stolen merchandise with angry villagers and 
gendarmes tracking them, and so lose much of their bargaining power to the well-insulated 
patrons. The regulatory process at both markets works something like this: Upon arrival from 
the south, sellers must stop at a checkpoint staffed by representatives of the gendarmerie, the 
urban commune in which the market is located, and the national police. Each bull is require to 
have an identity card called a FIB (Fiche Identitaire Bovin), detailing its personal history and 
previous owners. Each owner has a “cattle passport”, listing the physical description and origins 
of the cattle they are looking to sell. Before leaving their own district, they need to receive 
paperwork approval from a rural “delegate” of the state. They also need approval of the cattle’s 
vaccination records from a private veterinarian employed by the state. Theoretically, finding 







punish their owners. In reality, I heard every step of this process described as corrupt by 
multiple informants. False papers are generated by the “delegates”, sending indistinguishably 
false FIBs and passports on to the checkpoints just before the markets. Controllers at the 
markets are often aware of the falsity of the papers they’re receiving, and charge sellers steep 
bribes for the right to use them or to replace “lost” ones. Vets are infamous for falsifying 
vaccinations records and reaping massive benefits in illegal payments (one informant quipped 
that you find the town vet by finding her three cars) (Anonymous, November 9, 2015). In any 
case, while all participants seemed to be aware of the presence of stolen cattle in the market, 
few seem to have any qualms about dealing with them, especially as they’re often practically 
untraceable after having been sold 5-10 times before they reach market (Anonymous, 
November 19, 2015). The other major artery of the illicit traffic consists of the driving of cattle to 
various points on the coasts, often in conjunction with foreign buyers. While I was informed of 
the existence of a dizzying number of these networks, suffice to say that there are major ones 
being run from Toliara to South Africa, from Farafagana to China, from Mahajanga to the 
Comoros and Mauritius, and from illegal (usually Chinese-owned) slaughterhouses in Ihosy, 
Tana, and Toamasina. Insiders often blamed these illegal operations for buying up the rapidly 
depleting stock within the formal markets as well as the informal ones, exhausting the system 
before it can replenish itself and pushing out Malagasy buyers in the process. While it must be 
added that a number of legitimate foreign meat processors seem to be doing busy in Ihosy and 
Ambalavao, at least according to market officials there, the end results of high-volume foreign 
involvement in the formal sector are the same (Anonymous, November 21, 2015). As concerns 
the thieves themselves, participants identified as young adults from rural areas, deprived of 
economic and educational opportunity, craving the pleasures of life in town, and often fresh from 
finishing a stint in the Malagasy military. While it’s relatively easy to construct a profile of the 







heists. A university student from Ambalavao described the need to me for a number of his 
classmates to participate in cattle theft to pay high tuition rates (I was also told of the exorbitant 
bribes often required to get in to university courses, the cost of which begins at a price very 
much out of reach for the vast majority of rural families) (Anonymous, November 9, 2015). At 
the same time, another youth in Ambalavao emphasized the overriding desire to “have fun in 
life”, with many informants outlining the use of money for alcohol and “pleasure” (Anonymous, 
November 12, 2015). Regardless of the historical persistence of dahalo activity (which 
participants rarely emphasized, at least not before the 1970s), there was a pervasive sentiment 
throughout my interviews that deepening poverty and young people looking to “have fun in life” 
were responsible for a serious escalation of the practice and its violence. The degree to which 
this reflects broader panic as to the degradation of rural living standards is open to debate, but 
the presence of theft has clearly had some alarming effects on the whole of the system. 
Because possessing large numbers of big bulls makes farmers more conspicuous targets for 
theft, many herders have nervously begun to sell their herds, a once secure form of wealth 
which has started to look increasingly liquid. (Anonymous, November 10, 2015). The most 
compelling evidence of this , for me, was my experience with herds which were invariably 
smaller than what was described to me as “normal”: 5-10 cattle instead of 20-40, or even 50-
100. Desperately seeking to protect their vulnerable (and often only) assets, many communities 
have begun to hire “jama”, sorcerer figures from the southeast of the country who are purported 
to be impervious to bullets. One source said that these had been increasingly effective in 
deterring theft, but that “impostors” were arriving in equal numbers to swindle communities 










As the most frequently mentioned cause of decline, better understanding the reasons behind 
theft was crucial to my understanding of the roots of decline. However, perhaps more 
informative were the reasons behind the intimately-linked decline in the health of the cattle 
system and general living standards outlined to me by informants in Sakaviro, and largely 
echoed by government officials within the Ministry of Livestock. I contend that the three largest 
manifestations of physical “stress” outlined to me by the people I spoke with constitute an 
interconnected whole: this means poverty, environmental pressures, and population growth 
straining a system already weakened by social cohesion problems, institutional weakness, and 
theft (the former two are outlined further below.) As Bremner et al (2010) acknowledge, the 
existing body of research on the relationships between population, environmental degradation, 
and poverty remains tenuous, although there has been a lot of research indicating the existence 
of some relationship between these variables. Regardless of the formal theoretical body of 
evidence, my repeated brush-ins with these variables in conversations with my informants 
seems, to me, sufficient reason to consider them collectively. As we shall see, there are 
linkages between the three in the minds of participants which inform their understanding of a life 
that seems to be becoming increasingly difficult. 
Poverty- 
Allusions to increasingly entrenched poverty were blunt and widespread throughout the 
interview process. While the effects of “technical unemployment” are readily apparent in the 
streets of Ambalavao and Ihosy (a local government official told me that there were now throngs 
of beggars in town for the first time in living memory) (Anonymous, November 19, 2015). there 







informal, small-scale commerce) in the cattle towns than in the rural areas populated by herders 
themselves. The existence of deepening poverty in rural Ihorombe and Haute Matsiatra has had 
direct repercussions on cattle decline and, in turn, has been exacerbated by the effects of 
consequences stemming from the diminution itself.  While theft has already been explored as 
one of these, it by no means stands alone. With decreasing recourse to cattle as a financial 
service, informants felt increasingly nervous about their susceptibility to bad harvests, deaths, 
and cases of bad luck (Anonymous, November 16, 2015). Conversely, the effects of deepening 
poverty among small herders have had apparently detrimental effects on the health of the cattle 
system as a whole. Less and less able to adopt their well-worn strategy of buying small cattle, 
raising them for 4 or 5 years, and reselling them at a profit (and in doing so “absorbing” and hold 
large numbers of cattle in the rural hinterlands), farmers are increasingly powerless to stop the 
effective liquidation of herds by larger buyers from foreign companies or domestic 
slaughterhouses. Of course, poverty has forced herders to sell their cattle below easily 
replaceable levels, pushing many into a poverty trap.  There were some apparent nuances in 
the manifestation of that process between the two regions of study; while farmers in Haute 
Matsiatra had the benefit of recourse to relatively robust agricultural systems in the event of a 
loss of cattle wealth, there are large swathes of Ihorombe in which, according to officials from 
the Ministry of Livestock there, this would be a considerably less viable alternative. This 
illustrates the critical role played by climate and soil fertility in efforts to avoid descending into 
poverty traps.  
Environmental Stress-  
For many of those with whom I spoke in Sakaviro, a new headache has begun to arise: shifting 







livelihoods. The most immediately apparent manifestation of climate change in Madagascar9, at 
least according to the farmers currently experiencing it, has been a marked decrease in rainfall 
in recent years (Anonymous, November 16, 17, 2015). The results of this have been rather 
paradoxical. While crops yields are generally lower than they were ten or twenty years ago 
(forcing those who have cattle to sell them to make up harvest deficits more frequently than has 
traditionally been the case), one poor informant in the village of Soalatsena told me that the rain 
has resulted in a lack of “good omby food”. This has prompted many to convert less productive 
pasturage into crop land, reducing the area’s carry capacity for zebu. While this adaptation 
allows farmers to get the most out of their land in the short term, it reduces the strength of their 
four-hooved safety nets. As far as crop yields are concerned, meanwhile, the decline in recent 
years has forced those with cattle to sell large portions of their herds and those without them to 
try to find work as hired hands in neighboring fields in an effort to make enough cash to buy 
enough food to compensate for their meager returns (Anonymous, November 16, 2015). In the 
Ihorombe region, meanwhile, farmers have watched in horror as hailstorms have mounted in 
intensity (destroying many crops just a week before my arrival) and locusts who typically stop 
briefly on their way further north have begun to lay eggs and settle in to demolish precious fields 
(Anonymous, November 20, 2015). Livestock Ministry officials also confessed their anxiety to 
me about the malnutrition of many of the zebu coming to market in recent years (evident in 
every visible bovine ribcage), largely as a result of the degradation of the region’s famous 
pasturage by a combination drought and brushfires (Anonymous November 19, 2015). 
However, as Christian Kull writes in Isle of Fire, his examination of the brushfire phenomenon in 
rural Madagascar, such fires are often the result of carefully taken, historically informed 
decisions by Malagasy herders familiar with the particular needs of their rangelands (Kull, 2004, 
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p.272). While there certainly is evidence that irresponsible burning can lead to heavy erosion, 
Kull notes that “the most realistic stance is that there has always been fire in Madagascar, there 
always will be, and there always should be” (p.270). Unfortunately, one finds in the nation’s 
current anti-fire policy the same incessantly modernist state outlook (focused on formal, 
rationalized “solutions” to incomprehensibly local phenomena) described by Kaufmann in the 
case of the southwestern cactus (2008). Regardless, Ministry officials are aware of the 
exhaustion of soil as what they perceive to be result of these fires, despite the short-term bursts 
of plant growth for which they are set. One particularly intractable problem, to the official 
responsible for examining the phenomenon in Ihorombe, is the perception of pastures being 
essentially limitless to herders, despite the steady exhaustion of this collective resource. The 
resulting malnutrition of zebu has left huge numbers of cattle dangerously sickly and fragile- one 
merchant told me that a few weeks some 50 head died in a freezing rain in Ambalavao. 
(Anonymous, November 19, 2015). Collectively, these emerging strains have reduced the 
economic choices available to people in both regions, and placed a ceiling on the future of cattle 
raising in increasingly degraded and dry pasturages.  
Population Growth- 
Intimately connected to the problems with poverty and environmental stress is the burgeoning 
rural population, increasingly being forced to share diminishing resources amid stagnant 
economic growth, both locally and nationally (van den Heuvel and Evers, 2007). I was surprised 
at the consistency with which people who mentioned there being “too many kids today” explicitly 
connected this to deepening poverty. An interesting example is an older man I met in Sakaviro’s 
Visambo village, one of the wealthier and more colorful inhabitants of the community. He’s 
doing well for himself: he owns 40 hectares of land, in an area where 7 or 8 is more typical for 







kids-all 18 of them. Even with the land he inherited from his parents (he was an only child), each 
of his children will get only around 2 hectares. Increasingly, families are searching for land to 
rent or buy for their children, further adding to the rising cost of living. For many young people, 
the cattle and land passed down by one’s parents are absolutely critical to getting one’s start in 
life. He himself brought up the negative consequences of increasingly over-divided land, and 
tough-to-allocate cattle (Anonymous, November 17, 2015). Multiple informants spoke of 
difficulties in giving cattle to one’s children when there are more kids than cows, with the 
consequence that some daughters are married without dowries and some sons start without a 
single zebu to work their fields. Thus what was much wealth in one generation (in a place where 
most wealth is passed down from parent to child) has become insufficient by the next. 
Interestingly, participants were generally clear about there being no real “rural exodus” among 
young people in the area, despite what they acknowledged to be insufficient resources upon 
which to start a life and a family. Rather, many frantically search for work as hired hands in 
fields, as several of the young people with whom I spoke attested to doing. In fact, this 
unemployment seems to stem as much from the population growth itself as it does from the 
well-documented ills of the Malagasy economy, since it’s from this large pool of restless surplus 
rural labor that thieves are reportedly drawn (Anonymous, November 19, 2015). One informant 
told me that there were so many people looking for work that dahalo bands in Ihorombe often 
numbered 400 for a single raid! (Anonymous, November 3, 2015). Despite the acute awareness 
of the effects of overpopulation which I encountered in my interviews, family planning remains 
unpopular. A Ministry of Population & Women official in Ihosy had two explanations for this 
reluctance: first, people view children as a gift from God, helpful in working the land and caring 
for their parents when they get old. Second, she said frankly, people do not enjoy using 
contraceptives. Whatever the reasoning, she did say that a small but rising percentage of the 







Ambalavao or Iaratsena. With costs of living as high as they are, it seems understandable that 
farmers do not want to spend additional money on condoms (Anonymous, November 20, 2015). 
Institutions- 
Beyond these “physical stressors”, there exists a rapidly deteriorating institutional and social 
cohesiveness surrounding Madagascar’s cattle systems. An aspect of life in the areas I studied 
that particularly interested me was the presence (or lack thereof) of institutions in the lives of 
those working with cattle. What I found was a sharp disparity in institutional presence in towns 
and the countryside, particularly in terms of the Malagasy state. As we’ve seen, the state plays 
the type of heavy-handed, corrupt role in the cattle markets themselves predicted by Hatfield 
and Davies (2006). In an examination of the causes of corruption in business practice, Martin et. 
al (2009) found that  
Organizational anomie means that benevolent and principled climates tend to decline in relative influence 
while egoistic climates become more influential. Unchecked self-interest, in turn, can become the 
dominant normative framework. We believe, and the theoretical perspectives from which we draw 
support, that this is the organizational situation where corruption brews and thrives. (122) 
In the Malagasy context, this sort of institutional impediment of the normal functioning of the 
cattle trade goes well beyond the market itself: a panao hira kely who buys in Sakaraha each 
Friday told me he paid no less than 10 bribes to gendarmes and national police each time he 
made the trip to Ambalavao (Anonymous, November 12, 2015). A similar role is played by 
Malagasy tribunals, today charged with adjudicating disputes over cattle as well as cases of 
theft in Ambalavao and Ihosy. Legal costs are often backbreaking for cattle traders and herders, 
and accusations of corruption among the courts were widespread. The role of these courts has 
grown in importance since informal dina law was suspended in 2010, ostensibly because of 
corruption among those responsible for its implementation. Indeed, I ate dinner with a man who 







members community, and stripping them of their wealth through the resulting penalties. That 
being said, I also encountered a large number of respondents who believed that dina was the 
solution to today’s theft problem. When dina was in place, one source in Ihosy said, thieves 
were scared! He said that the courts survived off of fees and payments: they suspended dina 
because it was too effective in reducing theft. While there has been a superficial correlation with 
the suspension of customary cattle law and a rise in theft, it’s difficult to attribute causation to 
this. Dina is a system to reimburse, through a penalty, the owners of stolen cattle. It works 
within the fokonolona (members of a village community). It once consisted of certain measures 
of capital punishment, but this is no longer permitted by the national legal system. A family is 
still obliged to make reparations, however.  Dina is fluid, it changes often. It exists at village, 
district, and regional levels and it works with the state. While advocates of dina acknowledge the 
fact that it works closely with the state, they often presented it as an alternative to a government 
that was not doing its job. While dina still exists today in Ihorombe, it does so only intermittently 
and at the village level. For its findings to be considered valid by the state, a dina ruling needs 
approval from the village administrator, commune head, district chief, and regional governor 
(Anonymous, November 23, 2015)10. It is thus greatly reduced from its former status as a 
complementary legal organ to a state whose resources are often overextended. The potential 
importance of dina was emphasized to me by the commandant of the Ambalavao gendarmerie, 
among others, who spoke of the near impossibility of his underfunded and underequipped men 
enforcing the rule of law in the 20 rural communes surrounding Ambalavao (3 of which, 
according to local rumor, no longer have any cattle at all as a result of theft). His preferred 
strategy was to work together with rural authorities to provide additional measures of security for 
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a population his men cannot feasibly police (Anonymous, November 11, 2015). The Malagasy 
state was repeatedly said to have no presence in the Sakaviro area when I posed the question 
to participants. One local resident told me that although he was sure there must be a fokontany 
(the smallest unit of government in Madagascar) office somewhere in Sakaviro, he had no idea 
where it actually was (Anonymous, November 16, 2015). Beyond Sakaviro, the state has made 
efforts to make its military strength felt in some of the areas generally beyond its control: this 
year’s Operation Fahalamena, 2012’s Operation Tandroka, and even 1973’s Operation 
Ikalamavony all represent attempts by successive Malagasy administrations to confront an 
embarrassing and seemingly intractable rural scourge. While Bilal Tarabey’s Madagascar 
Dahalo provides reason to fear the human rights infractions often associated with these elite 
military unit-led operations, my participants tended to scorn the efficacy of what one man called 
a “patchwork” response: after the commandos return to Tana, regardless of how effective their 
operation has been, the dahalo return to fill the vacuum left by their unwelcomed guests 
(Anonymous, November 20, 2015) (Anonymous, November 12, 2015). There was a palpable 
sense of frustration on the part of people living in all three locations towards a central 
government seen to be missing in action. I was consistently told in my conversations that the 
state’s role was to “protect the peace”, an obligation that few felt was being met by those on 
high (Anonymous, November 9, 2015). Corruption and malfeasance, in any case, have made 
rural inhabitants less than eager to seek help from institutions in resolving disputes- the 
commandant told me that they usually prefer to violently resolve them among themselves 
(Anonymous, November 11, 2015). As we have seen, corruption among state veterinarians has 
led to rising numbers of sick cattle being passed off as healthy at market, further endangering 
the tottering system. There was, amongst all of this criticism of the current shambles in which 
the government now finds itself, another, more nostalgic thread present in the interviews: that of 







two officials told me, the state provided animal health care for herders free of charge 
(Anonymous, November 3, 23). This policy was said to have been reversed under Ratsiraka or 
Albert (1993-97), depending on the informant. Intriguingly, 1973, during the crisis which 
ultimately brought Ratsiraka to power, is the year to which Rasamoelina (1993) traces the 
proliferation of dahalo activity in Betsileo territory, due to the elimination of taxes on cattle by a 
Minister of the Interior “seeking to relax his grip” (Rasamoelina, 1993, p.23). Indeed, there 
appears to be a strong association between perceived spikes in theft and crises undermining 
the state’s capacity to enforce its monopoly on violence and provide critical services to herders.  
Ministry of Livestock officials bemoaned the lack of investment by the central government into 
projects aimed at preserving the disappearing omby gasy, despite the outsized role the zebu 
play in everyday life for farmers (Anonymous, November 3, 19, 2015)11.  Even more alarming is 
the fact that, according to the mayor himself, the city of Ihosy has received no funding from the 
government in Tana since 2009 (Anonymous, November 19, 2015). The lack of central state 
control over local government seems to encourage the rampant corruption common to local 
government functionaries. The only other “institutions” which seemed much in evidence during 
the study were the market structures themselves. Ihosy’s F.MMM (The Association of Herders, 
Intermediaries, and Buyers) whose founder I interviewed, is said around the market to be the 
new, de facto informal authority, even acting as a sort of ad-hoc dina in rural areas since the 
2010 suspension (Anonymous, November 23, 2015). Indeed, it is important to avoid a narrative 
of total government incompetence and bravely struggling industry workers striving for a clean 
system. Most people working in the Ambalavao and Ihosy markets seemed to be complicit in 
the culture of corruption surrounding them. It appears that this culture (at least in its current 
ubiquity) is viewed by locals as a result of the broader decline of state influence in the wake of 
                                                          







the 2009 political crisis (Anonymous, November 23, 2015). Ironically, as Kaufmann (2008) and 
Kull (2004) make abundantly clear, the broader recession of state authority has not precluded 
the implementation of heavy-handed top-down policies harmful to the fortunes of herders. In a 
sense, Malagasy herders have been handed the worst of both worlds: An absentee state whose 
handful of recognizable organs are suffocating the entire cattle economy, and to whom there are 
few real alternatives: despite my frequent questions as to other institutions or powers in both the 
towns and rural areas, I was never informed of the existence of institutions involved in cattle 
beyond the government, market groups, and dina.  
Social Cohesion and Perceptions of Change- 
To hear my informants speak of it, there have been fundamental shifts in the way Malagasy 
society functions. I chose to largely examine these shifts through the lens of the Malagasy 
concept of fihavanana, defined by the French scholar Frederic Sandron as a “system of norms, 
rules, and customs which govern local society, interpersonal behaviors, modes of sociability, 
and anti-risk strategies “(Sandron, 2008, pg. 1). Sandron (and, more importantly, my informants 
themselves) emphasizes the role of fihavanana as a fundamental arbiter of social relations, 
particularly in the rural context. My participants frequently evoked the idea in conjunction with 
situations requiring mutual aid-to help pay for funerals and burials, to allow a poorer neighbor to 
borrow a zebu to plow the fields, etc. Indeed, one source spoke wistfully of a time when people 
referred to all property collectively: come into “our” house, look at “our” cattle. (Anonymous, 
November 9, 2015). While a good portion of respondents maintained that fihavanana is as 
strong today as it ever was, most expressed misgivings as to its contemporary relevance. This 
was most apparent in frequent allusions to rising jealousy among neighbors and families, often 
manifested in petty theft, and, more disturbingly in violent attacks on family members. 







increasing violent and fractious disputes over succession to land and cattle. If a father dies, 
sons will pay third parties to kill each other rather than share the land among themselves (“It’s 
not that they can’t share, it’s that they don’t want to”). (Anonymous, November 11, 2015). While 
jealousy of wealth seems to have been a historical factor in Madagascar’s cattle system, 
interfamilial violence, rising theft (including of crops, chickens, and even water), and an 
increasing preoccupation with pleasure (kids today just want to have fun, to play, one 
Ambalavao student told me) among the young are certainly not. Furthermore, many of my 
informants in Ambalavao and Ihosy expressed their growing fears about rising drug use and 
alcohol consumption among the young, although many acknowledged that many Betsileo and 
Bara people have long been heavy-drinkers. To some, this is a sign of some sort of moral 
erosion among young people, and was frequently offered as an explanation for the rise in theft 
(Anonymous, November 9, 19, 2015). “People are divided”, many of my informants would tell 
me. There are also signs of this which are pertinent to the way cattle are actually raised. Many 
of the people working with cattle in Sakaviro, for example, told me that when they were younger, 
cattle had been herded and grazed collectively. With increasing suspicion, jealousy, and theft, 
men began to divide their herds. To many, this hoarding of wealth once regarded as communal 
is a disturbing sign that “fihavanana is almost destroyed” (Anonymous, November 12, 17, 2015).  
Analysis: What’s New? 
Throughout my exploration of Madagascar’s cattle systems, I have wrestled with questions of 
the historicity of today’s current ills as they relate to any sort of “new” developments. As we 
have found in the historical discussion in the early sections of this paper, considerable evidence 
points towards the existence of a cattle economy not hampered but defined by flux and (reliably 
violent) turmoil, from the wars of the short-lived Bara cattle kings of the 17th century to the bullet-







holistic discussion of the system needs to treat theft, no matter how disruptive or shocking it 
may seem, as a more or less constant variable. While there are changes afoot in Madagascar’s 
security situation, these are not to be found in the existence of largescale and violent theft. Nor 
is the system under anything approaching some sort of newly manifested foreign influence- 
cattle have been intimately linked to international trade in Madagascar for at least 400 years. 
Throughout those centuries, centralized states based in Tana (namely the Merina-dominated 
Kingdom of Madagascar, the French Colonial government, and today’s post-colonial state) have 
been deeply involved in the cattle economy (particularly exports), alternately helping and 
hindering the development of a healthy system in regions with outsized dependencies upon 
zebu. It would therefore be a mistake to construe the Malagasy cattle economy as existing in 
isolation. In point of fact, the system relies on outside demand for economic goods generated in 
increasingly marginal environments, like those found in the south. That being said, no amount of 
historical documentation of cattle theft and related ills seems to account for the sheer scale of 
chaos in today’s system, and the deep-seated panic which it is beginning to generate. And 
indeed, part of this chaos does appear, at least to my informants, to be attributable to a rising 
foreign demand for cattle. While it is important to acknowledge the role played by foreign 
consumption, however, nothing I have found in the course of this research leads me to believe 
that the deterioration of cattle livelihoods has its root causes beyond Madagascar. This is 
particularly evident in the manifestation of ethnic divisions in the way cattle crime is approached 
by the state, for instance. As Astuti (1995) found in her examination of the basis of identity 
among the Vezo in southwestern Madagascar, ethnicity is often constructed and perceived here 
as a facet of one’s occupation as much as anything else. Through this lens, one begins to 
understand the national-level stigmatization of the Bara, for instance, whose name literally 
means “rude, naïve, barbaric, and simple” (Kent 1970). It seems telling of the historical relations 







most closely associated with cattle raising is conceptualized of in such terms. Regardless of 
these internal divisions, however, there have been fundamental shifts affecting cattle both its 
viability as a resource and the way in which society and institutions interact with it. Despite what 
I feel to be a need to emphasize (often in opposition to the narratives of my informants), the 
venerable and cyclical nature of dysfunction and conflict within the cattle economy, these shifts 
do in fact mark significant departures from the way in which the system has characteristically 
lurched through time. This begins with something I have come to refer to as the “hardship 
trinity”. 
The “Hardship Trinity”-   Although the markets themselves often seemed to be the center of the 
omby universe, I have come to realize that the Malagasy cattle economy is anchored by the 
functions played within it by rural herders and farmers. Although the exchanges within the 
system are largely urban, most of the stock and actors involved are rural to the bone. With that 
in mind, the frequent mention of three distinct (and recently exacerbated) stressors upon life 
related to me by my rural informants made me sit up and pay attention. While the relationship 
between poverty, population, and environmental degradation has previously been within the 
context of the Vicious Circle Model (VCM) (which holds that deepening poverty, population 
growth, and environmental degradation operate as a series of positive feedback loops 
consistently worsening standards of living and the environment), Bremner et. al (2012) and de 
Sherbinin et. al (2008) are careful to avoid confirmation of the practical existence of such a 
circle. Their wide review of the existing literature on the subject seems to suggest that the 
relationships between the variables may not be as predictable as the VCM suggests. At the 
same time, there is little doubt that significant relationships exist between all three of these 
hardships. As such, it makes more sense to me to conceive of these relationships not as a circle 







definite “trinity”. This model may be particularly useful in the case of this study, as we are 
dealing not so much with explicit environmental destruction as broader environmental change, 
which does not seem to have been considered in its own right under the VCM. In any case, 
linkages between each of these variables were repeatedly made by my informants, particularly 
in the rural setting of Sakaviro. People are thinking about an increasingly difficult life through 
these three broad stresses:  as rainfall and crop yields decline, as parents struggle to allocate 
resources among their numerous children, and as poverty traps begin to restrict agency for an 
increasing proportion of the rural poor. As cattle is intimately linked to survival and prosperity in 
the rural setting, there are two-way interactions between the deteriorations in prosperity 
resulting from these stresses and one of said prosperity’s principal vehicle- the zebu. Thus we 
have the farmer who sold his herd to avoid poverty nonetheless mired within it and the farmer 
mired within poverty still unable to ride out of poverty on the back of a newly-bought bull. The 
lack of other opportunities amid a stagnant economy and deteriorating security situation have 
only served to compound the disproportional reliance upon zebu for the vast majority of people 
living outside of Madagascar’s urban areas, particularly in regions like Ihorombe and Haute 
Matsiatra where agriculture is less consistently reliable than in the rich-soiled north of the 
country, for instance. Keeping in mind that cattle theft as an act should be treated as constant, I 
have been nonetheless repeatedly confronted by the fact that this act as a response to poverty 
has increased commensurately with decreasing standards of living. This is where the “trinity” 
makes its presence felt: pastoralism as a response to a marginal environment is nevertheless 
jeopardized by changes in the direction of a yet more marginal environment. Despite the intense 
strain placed by the worsening of the “trinity” variables upon the lives of herders, however, I still 
saw signs of a social safety net responding to the stress. Take, for example, the farmer in 
Soalatsena who relied upon the generosity of his neighbors to plow his fields, or his neighbor 







rural Malagasy society, constantly adapting12 to a long history of economic turmoil, rapid 
change, and violent crime. Which is what has made uncovering new fractures within this 
beautifully adaptive society and its institutions so very troubling.
Figure 2: The “Hardship Trinity 
Multilevel Anomie in Cattle-Centric Communities-  
Writing in the late 19th century amid pan-European political instability and unfamiliar 
industrialization, the French sociologist Emile Durkheim was troubled by what he perceived to 
be an increasing “normlessness” taking root among his era’s increasingly harried generations. 
He termed this phenomenon “anomie”, which he defined as:  
an absence of norms or a fundamental conflict over societies basic values Durkheim called anomie, and 
he particularly feared that such a social ‘sickness’ would arise during a time of social upheaval or 
transition. In small-scale traditional societies, where relationships are personal and there is a limited 
division of labor, it is fairly easy for a general consensus as to the values and norms of society and of the 
rights and privileges of individual members to be established and upheld-especially if back by the moral 
authority and sanctions of religion. Everyone knows their place and aspires no higher. However, in the 
transition from the mechanical solidarity of such societies to the organic solidarity of industrial ones, 
where there is an extensive division of labor and relationships are often highly impersonal, a breakdown 
in social consensus and so of social controls over the individual is highly possible…Anomie literally 
means normlessness. It arises when social controls are weak, when moral and political restraints collapse 
and is particularly prevalent during periods of rapid social change, such as industrialization and 
                                                          
12 One of the most striking features of dina law, for example, is its inherent fluidity: it’s constituted and 
reconstituted every decade or so in the areas in which it is in effect, reflecting an admirable ability to evolve for 
such a vital institution. (Anonymous, November 23, 2015) 
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urbanization, when traditional norms and valued are disrupted and uprooted. People become restless and 
dissatisfied and a new moral consensus about what people can reasonably expect from life is needed. 
Industrialization and consumerism accentuate this process, encouraging specialization and self-interest. 
(Durkheim 2003, p.22, 26) 
Despite the obvious differences between Industrial Revolution France and as-yet-largely-rural 
Madagascar, I encountered multiple aspects of the “sickness” in Durkheim’s description 
throughout my interviews in both towns and villages. Perceptions of a steady erosion of morals 
and a “breakdown in social consensus” were very much in evidence. These phenomena, and 
the unique causes at work in creating them in Madagascar, were superbly documented by 
Richard Marcus in his 2008 article Tokana: The collapse of the rural Malagasy community:  
Robert Putnam’s now venerated (2001) findings in regard to the United States—that associational life is 
in decline—holds in Madagascar as well in that the decrease in social capital is having grievous social 
and economic effects on the community members. Yet in contrast to Putnam’s U.S. example, the root 
cause of the decline in Malagasy community life is economic hardship. People do not associate with one 
another because they are too busy trying to eat. Decreasing resources and the diminution of arable lands 
have collided with demographic changes, ecological challenges (Rakotoarisoa 1998), and the problems 
of self-serving elites, external interests, and economically challenging social norms to reduce 
associational opportunities. (Marcus 2008, p. 86) 
While Marcus uses Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone (2001) as the theoretical perspective 
through which he reaches his sobering conclusion, Putnam’s work is itself steeped in the 
rhetoric of social disintegration initially probed by Durkheim. Regardless, Marcus’ assertion that 
economic hardship is the root cause of anomie as it exists in rural Madagascar was seemingly 
reflected in the explicit links made by the people I spoke with between the deterioration of 
fihavanana and intensive poverty. Jealousy, interfamilial theft, and arranged assassinations 
between brothers do, however, mark an escalation of the forces at play in the mere erosion of 
associational life which Marcus described (notably before the 2009 crisis). If my participants are 
to be believed, there are initial signs of a near-complete “normlessness”: one in which local and 
even familial times are increasingly meaningless in the face of a desperate race to survive amid 
the worsening conditions of the “hardship trinity”. It’s important to reiterate that there was not a 







the frequency with which participants described symptoms in anomie in response to questions 
about recent changes in life. From a Durkheimian perspective, some of the predicted 
manifestations of anomie as it unfolded in industrializing Europe are coming to the fore in a 
Malagasy society increasingly interested in consumption. This is reflected in the increasing 
desires of young people from rural areas to benefit from the pleasures of life in town (and, 
purportedly, their willingness to steal to get to them). Within this wider tableau of anomie one 
finds, of course, the country’s most reliable constant: zebu. Marcus’ decision to look at 
associational life as a barometer of broader social cohesion is an apt one especially considering 
Putnam’s previous success using such a comparison, but I strongly believe that the singular 
importance of the zebu in assigning social status, providing a financial safety net, and serving 
as a magnet for exchange of all sorts in the form of cattle market towns makes it a uniquely 
useful lens through which to view the broader decline of social cohesion here. While a good 
portion of this paper has focused on the decline of the cattle population itself, there is good 
reason to believe that these two diminutions are connected, based on the body of evidence 
outlined above. To me, it is at the confluence of people and zebu, the markets, where one finds 
the most striking evidence of their tied fortunes, and the deterioration thereof. This is why I’ve 
come to conceptualize of the anomie at play in the Cattle Belt around Ambalavao and Ihosy as 
essentially “multilevel”. The role played by the cattle markets, and the institutions associated 
with them, is of critical importance in the lives of the rural and urban inhabitants of both of my 
regions of study. It has therefore been with some alarm that I have witnessed vivid examples of 
institutional decay and evidence of theft embedded within the very fabric of the market, with 
devastating consequences for all but the wealthiest participants in the market. As has been 
mentioned, corruption among the market’s regulatory bodies, the various levels of local 
government, and state veterinarians have all contributed in their own way to cattle decline. I 







the broader social bedrock of fihavanana and the ostensible restraining functions of the state 
have contributed to a culture of wanton theft and wrongdoing at all levels of the cattle economy, 
which has made the intensifying liquidation of the nation’s cattle wealth all the easier. This 
process has accelerated, in social and state terms, since the 2009 crisis, after which my 
participants noticed marked increases in both the brazenness and volume of corruption within 
the markets (Anonymous, November 23, 2015).  
Figure 3- Multilevel Anomie 
Synthesis and Conclusion: The Decline and (Prospective) Fall of Madagascar’s Cattle Empire-  
 South-central Madagascar’s cattle raisers face a difficult future. Despite the long history of 
volatility within their dearly-held system, including the frequently deleterious effects of a strong 
foreign demand for Malagasy livestock products and an often parasitic state based in 
Antananarivo, a cycle accustomed to instability is at risk of falling apart at the seams as a result 
of a bevy of new and worsening stressors. First and foremost, the longstanding practice of cattle 
theft has, indeed, become much more damaging to the system as a whole because of the pre-
existing razor thin margins of survival for herders. With cattle raisers afraid to own large zebu or 
numerous herds, an artificial ceiling of fear has limited the ability of the countryside to absorb 











consume cattle faster than the system can produce them. Social statuses predicated upon cattle 
wealth have witnessed a drop in the number of herders considered respectable by their peers, 
as fewer and fewer of the old grands patrons are able to avoid theft or the need to sell off their 
herds to cope with mounting costs of school fees and service access, not to mention much-
needed food to make up for increasingly frequent deficits in crop yields. Indeed, a veritable 
“hardship trinity” of poverty, environmental adversity, and population growth have placed 
unprecedented strains on a system already compromised by theft and insecurity. Historically, a 
dynamic and resilient social framework based on the idea of fihavanana and embedded within 
fluid institutions like dina law bodies would rise to the immense challenge posed by physical 
strain. Indeed, I encountered multiple examples of just that- adaptation and mutual aid. 
Increasingly, however, manifestations of a novel, wholly Malagasy version of the social 
normlessness predicted in times of rapid social change and crisis by (among others) Emile 
Durkheim have resulted in rising violence, jealousy, and general dysfunction. This is particularly 
the case in regards to the cattle economy on which so much of life in Ihorombe and Haute 
Matsiatra regions has its foundations. In my regions of study, I was constantly reminded of the 
multifaceted importance of the zebu, and the insights which their presence (or lack thereof) 
provide into the functioning of communities in which they are raised and exchanged. It was thus 
with great sadness that I became increasingly aware of the general corrosion of the institutions 
governing the points of exchange so vital to these communities, and usually failing to govern the 
rural hinterland at all. Part of this failure of the local arms of the central state’s institutions 
appears to be the result of repeated crisis and an almost complete lack of support, both financial 
and otherwise, from the capital. I contend, however, that the failures of these institutions are 
reflective of the wider fraying of social relations in the communities which host them. Thus we 
see widespread and tacitly accepted corruption, apathy towards the greater good of the system, 







panao hira kely (who also works as a government accountant) told me that while he didn’t want 
to steal, he felt he had to something to improve his life (Anonymous, November 19, 2015). It is 
telling of the extent to which the state has failed even its own agents in providing opportunities 
for advancement. What’s worse is the relative lack of alternative institutions in what should be 
an opportunity vacuum for cohesive groups. While some associations like Ihosy’s F.MMM are 
certainly beginning to assert themselves, the state’s suspension of Ihorombe’s dina law (which, 
to avoid any romanticization, was itself accused of corruption by several informants) in 2010 is 
in keeping with an increasingly cynical imperative within the cattle system to protect corrupt 
interests at the expense of healthy markets. One irony in this is the preoccupation of state 
institutions with protocols and bureaucracy at the expense of local knowledge and concerns 
often being flaunted by those formally tasked with safeguarding them. The blame falls too, 
however, upon the informal powers-that-be within the system: the grands patrons who fuel the 
trafficking of stolen cattle while knowing full-well its long-term effects on the system they depend 
on. The interconnected social disintegration within institutions and the general livestock raising 
population has begun to impede the ability of Malagasy herders to adapt to the rising physical 
hardships of the present, which seem to call out for a great deal more cooperation. If Marcus 
(2008) is to be believed, the deepening economic hardship one may expect to result from any 
continued decline in the size and quality of cattle herds will only serve to further strain the social 
fabric and institutions. The situation may not, however, be quite as dire as it seems. While the 
cattle systems under consideration here arguably face greater challenges than ever before, they 
have a long and distinguished history of overcoming adverse conditions causing panic and 
cynicism among the people who compose the systems. If there is hope, it is that this is not a 
society new to crisis: it is one forged in it. In the end, this is not about cows. This is about a 
collection of remarkable and complicated human beings struggling to keep their heads above 







                                                      
                                                      Recommendations- 
As several informants opined to me, there would be no need or room for dahalo if there weren’t 
people looking to buy stolen cattle. This encompasses, of course, Malagasy grands patrons, but 
it also includes Chinese, South African, Comorian, and Mauritian buyers operating in 
slaughterhouses on the island and waiting in boats offshore. Perhaps the most effective way to 
halt the erosion of Madagascar’s cattle wealth is to put pressure on the governments of 
countries which consume stolen cattle to crack down on their citizens’ illicit purchases in 
Madagascar. The contemporary political situation on the island itself seems to preclude much 
possibility of the Malagasy state itself adequately policing the cattle trade domestically, much 
less restricting foreign abuses. Towards this end, continued research on both the wider issues 
discussed in this paper (cattle decline and social disintegration being chief among them) and 
their palpable effects could go a long way towards starting some form of consumer-society 
backlash against the consumption of products whose legitimacy and legality, given the paucity 
of any sort of meaningful regulation, should not by any means be accepted at face value. It is up 
to consumers in the aforementioned countries to demand stricter standards for Malagasy cattle 
products. Perhaps more importantly, it is incumbent upon Western governments (namely 
France, the United States, and the European Union) to apply pressure to both the Malagasy 
government and the governments of consumer societies to re-examine the existing 
consumption of zebu abroad. The long-term answer, of course, is for Madagascar to break its 
damning cycle of political crisis and the connected breakdown of social relations. Participants 
pined for the days when the state provided support for both the health and safety of rural 
inhabitants and their animals. While the current reality of poverty and state fragility may make a 







semblance of continuity within which institutions can begin to repair themselves is a pre-
requisite for any amelioration of the situation. If history is any guide, it is the role of dominant 
political units (today, Madagascar’s Fourth Republic) to assert themselves over the slow-burning 
chaos that is the cattle economy. The Malagasy government would do well to rediscover that. 
                                               Questions for Further Study- 
With the considerable limitations inherent within both this paper’s methodology and its validity, 
further research is still greatly needed on a variety of pressing, unanswered questions. To me, 
foremost among these are those concerning the unique manifestations of anomie and cattle 
decline elsewhere in Madagascar, particularly in the even more strained regions of the far 
south, such as Atsimo Andrefana and Antandroy. If my findings have any truth to them, it is in 
these regions that one may observe the most severe consequences of the processes described 
here. As has been acknowledged, the exact relationships between the hardship variables of 
poverty, resource degradation, and population remain poorly understood, and further study of 
the explicit connections (if they exist) among these factors could have lasting implications for the 
future of sustainable development and poverty relief. Lastly, considerable effort should be made 
to re-establish some sort of credible awareness of the size Malagasy cattle population. The 
obscurity shrouding existing data on zebu makes effective deterrence of theft and monitoring of 
illness next to impossible. With the Ministry of Livestock (by its own admission) unable to 
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                                                               Glossary of Terms 
Dahalo- A Malagasy cattle thief. Purported to be a distortion of a Bara rite of passage, it stands 
for what is in fact a long-running, geographically dispersed phenomenon. 
Dina- A Malagasy legal tradition practiced alternately at the village, commune, district, and 
regional level. While also associated with conversation efforts, the tradition has played a vital 
role in attempting to control cattle theft.  
FIB (Fiche Identitaire Bovin) - The primary method of documentation within Madagascar’s cattle 
economy, a biographical form accompanying each zebu sold at market. 
Fihavanana- Madagascar’s “system of norms, rules, and customs which govern local society, 
interpersonal behaviors, modes of sociability, and anti-risk strategies. “(Sandron, 2008, pg. 1) 
Fokonolona- The Malagasy term for the citizenry of a village, in this context constituting dina 
bodies.  
Fokontany- Base-level administrative unit determined by population in Madagascar, at the 
neighborhood level in cities, but covering a wider geographic area in less densely populated 
rural areas.  
Jama- While I initially thought that the term referred to any local defense group combatting cattle 
theft in the rural areas, it seems to refer pointedly to men employed in that capacity who come 
from the south-east of the country, purportedly with certain charms and “sorceries” which give 
them special protection against harm. 







Panao Hira Kely- While the term’s meaning is rather fluid in its reference to those working in 
specific roles in the cattle economy, it tends to refer to those who buy at one market (usually 
Sakaraha or Ihosy) and sell for a higher price at another (usually Ambalavao). 
Panera/Demarcheur- Constituting a majority of those working on market days, the panera is 
responsible for seeking out buyers and initiating price negotiations on behalf of more powerful 
patrons. Panera make very little on each transaction in relation to their employers. 
Patron-Again, a fluid term, and often one of respect in the markets, but also signifying a 



















Map of Study Region and Associated Cattle Chain 
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